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Collective decision problems are considered with a finite number of agents who
have single-peaked preferences on the real line. A probabilistic decision scheme
assigns a probability distribution over the real line to every profile of reported
preferences. The main result of the paper is a characterization of the class of unani-
mous and strategy-proof probabilistic schemes with the aid of fixed probability dis-
tributions that play a role similar to that of the phantom voters in H. Moulin
(Public Choice 35 (1980), 437455). Thereby, the work of Moulin (1980) is
extended to the probabilistic framework. Journal of Economic Literature Classifica-
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1. INTRODUCTION
Consider the following elementary collective decision problem. There are
two alternatives a and b and two agents 1 and 2. Agent 1 prefers a to b,
whereas agent 2 prefers b to a. Exactly one alternative must be chosen. The
only, at least ex ante, fair solution to this problem seems to be to give each
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We thank two anonymous referees whose comments led to an improvement of the paper.Somewhat surprisingly, the study of such probabilistic schemes in the
theory of social choice has been rather limited. To a considerable extent,
this may be due to the fact that under the requirement of strategy-proofness
which means that it never pays to lie about one's true preferences, a
strong but natural condition in collective decision making where individual
preferences are private informationthe existence of nondictatorial
probabilistic schemes is not obvious. In fact, the solution suggested for the
simple problem above is a so-called random dictatorship where each agent
has an equal chance of being the dictator. The example shows that a
random dictatorship may be the most obvious solution. Random dictator-
ships came up in the first studies on strategy-proof probabilistic schemes by
Gibbard [15, 16], in the classical model of social choice with all preferences
admissible.
This leaves the question open as to whether in a more restricted context
probabilistic schemes other than random dictatorships can be strategy-proof.
For the deterministic setting the impossibility (i.e., dictatorship) results of
Gibbard [14] and Satterthwaite [21] can be avoided by restricting the set
of preferences and at the same time adapting the domain of alternatives. In
particular, Moulin [18] characterizes classes of schemes on the real line
that are nondictatorial and strategy-proof with respect to single-peaked
preferences. These results have later been extended in several directions by
many authors.
Also in the framework considered by Moulin [18] deterministic rules
may be unsatisfactory. Suppose there are 201 agents, 100 of which have
their peak at a, whereas the other 101 agents have their peak at b, b{a.
Then the median rule without phantom voters picks the alternative b where
a lottery between a and b seems to be more fair, at least ex ante.
In the present paper, we adopt the Moulin framework but consider
probabilistic rules. Such a rule assigns to every profile of reported
individual preferences a probability distribution over the real line. The
interpretation is that the final outcome can be drawn from this distribution,
as in the simple example above. Alternatively, given a profile, the number
assigned by the scheme to a (measurable) subset of the real line can be
interpreted as the probability that the final outcome will be in this set at
this profile.
The main property that we impose is strategy-proofness. In order to for-
mulate this condition the preferences of the agents must be extended to
probability distributions. This will be done as follows. For a given single-
peaked preference an agent (weakly) prefers one probability distribution
over another if the former assigns at least as much probability to any upper
contour set of the preference as the latter. Here, an upper contour set is an
interval around the peak of the preference consisting of those points that
are weakly preferred to a given outcome. In other words, preference over
409 STRATEGY-PROOF PROBABILISTIC DECISION SCHEMESprobability distributions is defined in terms of first degree stochastic
dominance. A probabilistic rule is strategy-proof if honest reporting always
results in a probability distribution that (weakly) dominates, in the sense
just described, any probability distribution brought about by lying. This
conditionwhich is analogous to the one adopted by Gibbard [15,
16]is quite strong; in particular it implies comparability in the sense of
stochastic dominance between the probability distributions induced by the
scheme in case of honest and false reporting by any agent. It is, however,
a natural condition in a framework where the mechanism can only use
ordinal information about the agents' preferences becauseby the familiar
characterization of first-degree stochastic dominanceit implies that no
agent can gain by lying independent of any possible von Neumann
Morgenstern representation of his preference. Moreover, it still admits a
large class of probabilistic rules.
The first important result is that every strategy-proof probabilistic
scheme which is peaks-onlythe rule depends only on the peaks of the
reported preferencesis characterized by 2
n (the number of subsets of
agents) fixed probability distributions. These fixed probability distributions
play a role similar to the fixed ballots (phantom voters) in the deterministic
setting of Moulin [18], but the actual description of the probabilistic rule
is considerably more complicated. We call these rules fixed-probabilistic-
ballots rules. A random dictatorship is one example of such a rule. Another
example for two agents is the following. Fix a distribution, for instance
a normal distribution, on the real line. Take the two reported peaks of
the agents, transfer all the weight of the distribution left from the lower
peak to this peak, transfer all the weight right from the higher peak to the
higher peak, and between the peaks just take the distribution originally
fixed.
Adding anonymity reduces the number of fixed probabilistic ballots to
n+1 (the number of different cardinalities of subsets of agents).
Second, it is shown that under strategy-proofness, peaks-onliness is
implied by the very weak and natural unanimity property: if all agents
report the same preference, then the rule attaches probability one to the
peak of that common preference.
The results of Moulin [18] for deterministic rules follow from our results
for probabilistic rules, and even in a stronger fashion, because the
peaks-onliness condition can be dispensed with. This is also proved directly
in Barbera  and Jackson [4] and Ching [8].
As hinted above the strategy-proofness condition can also be formulated
in terms of utility representations of preferences. If the condition depends
not only on the preferences but also on the specific utility representation,
then, in general, it becomes weaker, hence less demanding. See, in par-
ticular, Freixas [13] and Barbera  et al.[ 3 ] .
410 EHLERS, PETERS, AND STORCKENSome other references from the literature on probabilistic social choice
mechanisms are Barbera  and Sonnenschein [5], Dutta [11], Bandyopadhyay
et al. [2], and Pattanaik and Peleg [19]but this list is not exhaustive.
Recently, probabilisticmechanismsinprivategoodscontextshavebeenstudied
by Sasaki [20], Abdulkadirog $ lu and So  nmez [1], Cre  s and Moulin [9, 10],
and Bogomolnaia and Moulin [6]. The first reference concerns a probabilistic
extension of the uniform rule for the division problem with single-peaked
preferences and identical indivisible objects. The other references deal with
random assignment of heterogeneous indivisible objects.
The extension of the present one-dimensional framework to more dimen-
sions can be found in Dutta et al. [12], where it is shown that unanimity
and strategy-proofness imply random dictatorship if all strictly convex
single-peaked preferences are admissible.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the probabilistic
model including the ordinal extension of preferences, strategy-proofness,
Pareto-optimality, and other requirements. In Section 3 we show that
strategy-proofness and peaks-onliness are equivalent to the so-called uncom-
promisingness property, introduced by Border and Jordan [7] for the
deterministic model, and extended here to the probabilistic case. This
property is an important consequence of strategy-proofness and peaks-onli-
ness (or unanimity) and plays a crucial role in our analysis. Section 4 con-
tains the characterization of all strategy-proof and peaks-only probabilistic
rules. Section 5 extends the analysis to include unanimity instead of
peaks-onliness. Section 6 discusses the implications of our results for the
deterministic case. The Appendix contains some elements of measure
theory that we use in this paper.
2. THE PROBABILISTIC APPROACH
We consider the problem of choosing a level of a public good on the real
line R.
2 Let N#[1, ..., n] denote the finite set of agents who collectively
have to choose an element in R. Each agent i # N is equipped with a
``single-peaked'' preference relation Ri over R. Single-peakedness of Ri
means that there exists a real number p(Ri)#R, called the peak of Ri, with
the following property: for all x, y # R,i fx<yp(Ri)o rx>yp(Ri),
then yPix. As usual, xRi y means ``x is weakly preferred to y,'' and xPi y
means ``x is strictly preferred to y.'' Let R denote the class of all single-peaked
preference relations over R. Let R
N denote the set of all (preference) profiles
R=(Ri)i # N such that for all i #N, Ri # R. Given R # R
N, let p(R)#(p(Ri))i # N
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2 All results remain true if we restrict R to a closed interval [a, b] or an open interval ]a, b[,
a, b #R.denote the profile of peaks at R, p





3 Given SN, let RS#(Ri)i # S denote the
profile R restricted to S. Given i # N and R, R  # R
N, profiles R and R  are
called i-deviations if RN"[i]=R  N"[i].
A deterministic (decision) rule . is a function that selects for each R # R
N
a level in R, denoted by .(R). We extend the original analysis of deter-
ministic rules by considering ``probabilistic'' rules. A probabilistic (decision)
rule 8 is a function that selects for each R # R
N a (probability) distribution
over R, denoted by 8(R). For all (measurable) subsets X of R, the number
8(R)(X), which the distribution 8(R) assigns to X, is the probability that
the final level belongs to X. We consider distributions defined on the Borel
_-algebra L. Elements of L are called Borel sets. Appendix A contains all
results from measure theory that are used in this paper.
A deterministic rule can be seen as a probabilistic rule that selects for
each R# R
N a distribution placing probability 1 on a single level in R.W e
extend preferences over levels in R to preferences over distributions
ordinally (Gibbard [15]; Bogomolnaia and Moulin [6]). This ordinal
extension is based on the concept of upper contour sets.
Given x # R and Ri # R, the weak upper contour set of x at Ri is defined
by B(x, Ri)#[y# R | yRix], and the strict upper contour set of x at Ri is
defined by B%(x, Ri)#[y# R | yPix]. The single-peakedness of Ri implies
that these upper contour sets are intervals which are either closed, open or
half open. In particular, they are Borel sets.
In the probabilistic model, we extend preferences in the following way.
Given a preference relation Ri # R and two distributions Q, Q$ over R, Q
is weakly preferred to Q$ under Ri,i fQ assigns to each weak upper con-
tour set of Ri at least the probability that is assigned by Q$ to this set.
Abusing notation we use the same symbols to denote preferences over
distributions and preferences over levels.
Ordinal extension of preferences. For all Ri # R and all distributions
Q, Q$ over R, QRiQ$ if and only if
for all x # R, Q(B(x, Ri))Q$(B(x, Ri)). (1)
Furthermore, QPiQ$ if and only if
QRiQ$ and for some y # R, Q(B(y, Ri))>Q$(B(y, Ri)). (2)
Inequality (1) is a first order stochastic dominance condition; in par-
ticular it requires that the distributions Q and Q$ are comparable in that
respect.Therefore, our extensionis not completeover theset ofalldistributions
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3 As explained later (Remark 2.1), E(R) is the set of efficient levels at profile R.over R. But note that for preferences over distributions completeness is a
demanding requirement.
Our first lemma shows that we can equivalently extend preferences with
respect to strict upper contour sets.
Lemma 2.1. Let Ri # R and Q, Q$ be distributions over R. Then QRiQ$
of and only if
for all x # R, Q(B%(x, Ri))Q$(B%(x, Ri)). (3)
Furthermore, QPiQ$ if and only if
QRiQ$ and for some y # R, Q(B%(y, Ri))>Q$(B%(y, Ri)). (4)
Proof. We show only the equivalence for (3). For the only-if part, let
QRiQ$a n dx # R. We have to show (3). Observe that B
o(x, Ri) is an inter-
val between two points a, b # R_[&,+ ] and its form is ]a, b],
]a, b[o r[ a, b[. In each case we can find a sequence x1, x2, ... such that










Since QRiQ$, for all k # N,
Q(B(xk, Ri))Q$(B(xk, Ri)).
Combining these inequalities with the equalities above yields (3).
The if-part follows in a similar way. K
From now on, we use [(1) and (2)] or [(3) and (4)] for our ordinal
extension of preferences.
Our main interest is in strategy-proofness. This means that agents cannot
gain from misrepresenting their true preferences.
Strategy-proofness. For all i # N and all R, R  # R
N such that RN"[i]=
R  N"[i]: 8(R) Ri8(R  ).
Strategy-proofness ensures that no agent can increase the probability of
any weak upper contour set by misrepresenting his true preference.
Observe that this notion of strategy-proofness is a stochastic dominance
413 STRATEGY-PROOF PROBABILISTIC DECISION SCHEMEScondition; in particular it requires comparability in this respect of the
distributions 8(R) and 8(R  ). It implies that for any von Neumann
Morgenstern utility function representing an agent's preference relation, his
expected utility is maximal when he reports his true preference relation.
The next property we discuss says that for each profile, there does not
exist a distribution that all agents weakly prefer to the distribution assigned
by the probabilistic rule to this profile with strict preference for some agent.
Let Q, Q$ be distributions over R. If for all i # N, QRiQ$ and for some
j# N, QPjQ$, then we call Q a Pareto improvement of Q$.
Pareto-optimality. For all R # R
N, there exists no Pareto improvement
of 8(R).
Remark 2.1. A deterministic rule satisfies Pareto-optimality if and only
if for all R # R
N, .(R)#E(R). Therefore, we call E(R)t h ePareto set of R.
We show that a probabilistic rule satisfies Pareto-optimality if and only
if it only selects distributions that place for each profile probability 1 on its
Pareto set. Therefore, in our model, ex-post efficiency is equivalent to
Pareto-optimality.
Lemma 2.2. Let 8 be a probabilistic rule. Then 8 satisfies Pareto-
optimality if and only if for all R # R
N, 8(R)(E(R))=1.
Proof. For the only-if part, suppose that 8 satisfies Pareto-optimality.
Assume that there exists R # R
N such that 8(R)([p

(R), p (R)])<1.
Without loss of generality, suppose that 8(R)(]&, p

(R)[)>0. Let j # N
be such that p(Rj)=p






and Q equal to 8(R)o n] p








(R), it follows that QPj8(R),
which contradicts Pareto-optimality.
For the if-part, let R# R
N and 8(R)([p

(R), p (R)])=1. Without loss of
generality, suppose that p(R1) }}} p(Rn). Let Q be a distribution over





(R), p (R)] and 8(R)([p





(R), p (R)])=1. (5)










(R), p (R)]. By (5), p(R1)=p

(R), and QR18(R),
Q([p(R1), x])=Q(B(x, R1))8(R)(B(x, R1))=8(R)([p(R1), x]). (7)
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Q(]x, p(Rn)])=Q(B
o(x, Rn))8(R)(B
o(x, Rn))=8(R)(]x, p(Rn)]). (8)
Since [p(R1), x] and ]x, p(Rn)] are disjoint, and [p(R1), x]_ ]x, p(Rn)]
=[p

(R), p (R)], (5), (7), and (8) together imply Q([p(R1), x])=
8(R)([p(R1), x]). Hence, by (6), for all ]a, b][p













Thus, by (5), for all ]a, b]/R, Q(]a, b])=8(R)(]a, b]). Because the
_-algebra L is generated by the set of the left half open intervals
[]a, b]|a, b # R, ab] (cf. Remark A.3), we have that Q=8(R), the
desired conclusion. K
Finally, we introduce three requirements. The first one says that at unan-
imous profiles the probabilistic rule places probability one on the common
peak. The second one says that the probabilistic rule is symmetric in its
arguments. The third one says that the probabilistic rule only depends on
the profile of peaks.
Let 6
N denote the set of all permutations on N. For all R # R
N and all
? # 6
N, let R? denote the profile (R?(i))i # N.
Unanimity. For all R # R
N such that for all i, j # N, Ri=Rj : 8(R)
([p(R1)])=1.
Anonymity. For all R # R
N and all ? # 6
N : 8(R)=8(R?).
Peaks-onliness. For all R, R  # R
N such that p(R)=p(R  ):8(R)=8(R  ).
Note that Pareto-optimality implies unanimity, but not the other way
around.
3. UNCOMPROMISINGNESS
In this section we show that strategy-proofness together with peaks-
onliness is equivalent to a condition called uncompromisingness. In the
deterministic setting, uncompromisingness means that after an i-deviation
the outcome does not change whenever the changed peak remains on the
same side of the outcome. Therefore, if p(Ri) is below the outcome and
R, R  are i-deviations such that p(R  i) is less than or equal to that outcome,
then at R and R  the same level is chosen. Border and Jordan [7] show in
415 STRATEGY-PROOF PROBABILISTIC DECISION SCHEMESthe deterministic model that unanimity and strategy-proofness imply uncom-
promisingness. In their setting single-peaked preferences are symmetric
around the peak and peaks-onliness is implied by this assumption.
We extend the definition of uncompromisingness to the probabilistic
model in the following way. A probabilistic rule satisfies uncompromising-
ness if for all i-deviations the assigned probability does not change for
those subsets of the real line which have not been crossed by this unilateral
peak change. Therefore, if R and R  are i-deviations, then the distributions
8(R)a n d8(R  ) are equal outside the closed interval [min[p(Ri), p(R  i)],
max[p(Ri), p(R  i)]].
Given a, b # R, let conv(a, b) denote the convex hull of a and b, i.e., the
closed interval with endpoints a and b.
Uncompromisingness. For all i # N, all R, R  # R
N such that RN"[i]=
R  N"[i], and all X # L such that X&conv(p(Ri), p(R  i))=< : 8(R)(X)=
8(R  )(X).
Remark 3.1. Because 8(R) and 8(R  ) are distributions, uncompromising-
ness implies that 8(R)(conv(p(Ri), p(R  i)))=8(R  )(conv(p(Ri), p(R  i))).
In the following two lemmas we prove that uncompromisingness is equiv-
alent to the combination of strategy-proofness and peaks-onliness.
Lemma 3.1. Let 8 be a probabilistic rule. If 8 satisfies strategy-proof-
ness and peaks-onliness, then 8 satisfies uncompromisingness.
Proof.L e t i # N, R, R  # R
N be i-deviations, and [a, b[ be an interval
such that [a, b[ &conv(p(Ri), p(R  i))=<. Since a finite measure is
uniquely determined by the weights on such intervals (cf. Remark A.3), it
suffices to prove that 8(R)([a, b[)=8(R  )([a, b[). Because [a, b[ is dis-
joint from conv(p(Ri), p(R  i)), we have to distinguish two cases.
Case 1. a>max[p(Ri), p(R  i)]. Let c<min[p(Ri), p(R  i)]. Let R$, R",
R  $, R  "#R
N be i-deviations from R such that p(R$ i)=p(Ri")=p(Ri), p(R  $ i)=
p(R  i")=p(R  i), B
o(a, R$ i)=B
o(a, R  $ i)=]c, a[, and B
o(b, Ri")=B









where the two equalities follow from peaks-onliness and the inequality from
strategy-proofness. Hence, 8(R)(]c, a[)8(R  )(]c, a[). Similarly the reverse
inequality holds. Therefore, 8(R)(]c, a[)=8(R  )(]c, a[).
416 EHLERS, PETERS, AND STORCKENBy considering R" and R  " we analogously deduce 8(R)(]c, b[)=
8(R  )(]c, b[). Thus,
8(R)([a, b[)=8(R)(]c, b[)&8(R)(]c, a[)
=8(R  )(]c, b[)&8(R  )(]c, a[)
=8(R  )([a, b[),
which is the desired result.
Case 2. bmin[p(Ri), p(R  i)].I fb<min[p(Ri), p(R  i)], then similar
to Case 1 it follows that 8(R)([a, b[)=8(R  )([a, b[). If b=min[p(Ri),
p(R  i)], then similar to the proof of Lemma 2.1 we can use the previous
fact and Theorem A.1 to show that 8(R)([a,m i n [p(Ri), p(R  i)][)=
8(R  )([a,m i n [p(Ri), p(R  i)][). K
Lemma 3.2. Let 8 be a probabilistic rule. If 8 satisfies uncom-
promisingness, then 8 satisfies strategy-proofness and peaks-onliness.
Proof. It is straightforward to show that uncompromisingness implies
peaks-onliness. In order to show strategy-proofness, let i # N and R, R  # R
N
be such that RN"[i]=R  N"[i]. Without loss of generality, suppose that
p(R  i)<p(Ri). We show that for all x #[p(R  i), p(Ri)[,
8(R)(]x, p(Ri)])8(R  )(]x, p(Ri)]), (9)
and for all x #] p(R  i), p(Ri)],
8(R)([x, p(Ri)])8(R  )([x, p(Ri)]). (10)
First, we prove (9). Let x #[p(R  i), p(Ri)[ and y #[p(R  i), p(Ri)[ be such
that x<y.L e tR$#R be an i-deviation of R such that p(R$ i)=y. Then
8(R)(]x, p(Ri)])=8(R$)(]x, p(Ri)])
8(R$)(]y, p(Ri)])
=8(R  )(]y, p(Ri)]),
where the first equality follows from Remark 3.1 and uncompromisingness,
and the second from uncompromisingness. Thus, for all y #] x, p(Ri)[
8(R)(]x, p(Ri)])8(R  )(]y, p(Ri)]). Hence, similar to the proof of
Lemma 2.1, Theorem A.1 yields (9).
417 STRATEGY-PROOF PROBABILISTIC DECISION SCHEMESTo show (10), by interchanging the roles of R and R  it follows that for
all x #] p(R  i), p(Ri)],
8(R  )([p(R  i), x[)8(R)([p(R  i), x[).
Hence, Remark 3.1 yields (10).
By (9), (10), and uncompromisingness, for all z # R,
8(R)(B(z, Ri))8(R  )(B(z, Ri)).
This is the strategy-proofness requirement for 8 at R and R  . K
Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2 yield the following corollary.
Corollary 3.1. The combination of strategy-proofness and peaks-
onliness is equivalent to uncompromisingness.
Corollary 3.1 is the important tool for the proofs in the following section.
In Section 5 we show that Corollary 3.1 remains valid in the deterministic
model.
4. STRATEGY-PROOFNESS AND PEAKS-ONLINESS
In this section we give a complete description of the probabilistic rules
satisfying strategy-proofness and peaks-onliness in terms of fixed probability
distributions. More precisely, such a probabilistic rule determines for each
subset S of N a fixed probabilistic ``ballot'' over R  #R_[&,+ ].I ti s
obtained by taking the limits of the probabilistic rule where the peaks of
the preferences of the agents in S converge to & and the peaks of the
preferences of the agents in N"S to +. As probability can vanish to &
or + these distributions are defined on the compactified real line.
4
To describe how, conversely, these fixed probability distributions deter-
mine the probabilistic rule some additional notation is needed. This
notation will be used throughout the rest of the paper.
Given R # R
N, let p
1(R), ..., p
k(R), kn, denote the different peaks at R







k(R)=p (R), and [p
l(R)|l # [1, ..., k]]=[p(Ri)|i #N].L e tSl denote the
set of agents whose peaks at profile R are lower than or equal to p
l(R).
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4 If the set of alternatives is restricted to a closed interval, then the endpoints of this interval
play the same roles as & and +.For all S#2
N, let DS be a probability distribution over R  . We call
2#(DS)S #2 N a collection of fixed probabilistic ballots if the following holds:
(i) D<([&])=0;
(ii) DN([+])=0; and
(iii) for all S, TN and all x # R,
DS_T([&, x])&DS([&, x[)0. (11)
Inequality (11) will ensure the nonnegativity of a probabilistic rule
defined on the basis of a collection of fixed probabilistic ballots. It is easy
to check that (11) is equivalent to the following: for all S, TN and all
x # R,
DS_T([&, x])&DS([&, x])0.
In other words, the (cumulative) distribution functions of larger coali-
tions first-degree stochastically dominate those of smaller coalitions. Given
X# L, let 1X denote the indicator function of the set X.
Fixed-probabilistic-ballots rule, 8
2. Given a collection 2=(DS)S#2 N of
fixed probabilistic ballots, the fixed-probabilistic-ballots rule 8
2 based on 2
is defined as follows. For all R # R
















To get some grasp on formula (12), consider an arbitrary profile R # R
N.
The distribution 8
2(R) is equal to the distribution D< on the interval
]&, p

(R)[. For all l # [1, ..., k&1], the distribution 8
2(R) is equal to
DSl on the interval ]p
l(R), p
l+1(R)[. On the interval ]p (R), +[, the
distribution 8
2(R) is equal to DN. The probabilities of the peaks at R are
determined in the following way: for all l # [1, ..., k] the weight placed by
8
2(R)o np
l(R) is equal to the probability placed by DSl on the interval
[&, p
l(R)] minus the probability placed by DSl&1 on the half open inter-
val [&, p
l(R)[. Condition (11) ensures the nonnegativity of 8
2(R).
Note that the interval in the first term in (11) is closed but the interval in
the second term is half open. The _-additivity of 8
2(R) follows
immediately from definition (12) and the fact that the DS, S #2
N, are
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where the third equality follows from the fact that D<([&])=0, and
the fourth from the fact that DN([+])=0. Hence, 8
2(R) is a probabil-
ity distribution over R, the desired conclusion.
In order to illustrate these definitions we include two examples. The first
one is a random dictatorship formulated in terms of fixed probability dis-
tributions based on formula (12). Obviously, the class of rules that can be
defined with the aid of (11) and (12) is much bigger.
Example 4.1. Let : # R
N be a vector of weights, i.e., for all i# N, :i0,
and 
n
j=1:j=1. For all SN, let DS be the probability distribution over
R  putting weight i # S :i on & and the remaining weight on + (where
the empty summation is defined to be equal to 0). Then (12) defines the
random dictatorship where agent i has weight :i.
Example 4.2. Let N=[1, 2].L e tD< be the uniform distribution over
the interval [3, 4], and D[1], D[2], and DN be uniform distributions over
the intervals [2, 3], [1, 2], and [0, 1], respectively. Then (11) is satisfied
and 2#(D<, D[1], D[2], DN) is a collection of fixed probabilistic ballots.
For example, let R # R
N be such that p(R1)=1 and p(R2)=3. Then, by
(12), 8
2(R)=8
2(R1, R2)=D[1] and 8
2(R2, R1)=D[2].
The following theorem states that each strategy-proof and peaks-only
probabilistic rule is determined by 2
n fixed probability distributions as in
(12).
420 EHLERS, PETERS, AND STORCKENTheorem 4.1. The fixed-probabilistic-ballots rules are the only proba-
bilistic rules satisfying strategy-proofness and peaks-onliness. Moreover, if a
probabilistic rule is strategy-proof and peaks-only, then the collection of
fixed probabilistic ballots is uniquely determined.
Proof. By definition, fixed-probabilistic-ballots rules are peaks-only.
Strategy-proofness follows easily with the aid of Corollary 3.1. The proof of
this is left to the reader.
Now, let 8 be a probabilistic rule satisfying strategy-proofness and
peaks-onliness. The proof consists of two steps. In the first step we con-
struct the probability distributions DS, and in the second we prove the
validity of (12).
Step 1. Construction of the probability distributions DS. Given x # R,
let R
x# R
N be such that for all i # N, p(R
x
i )=x.L e tS #2








N"S)(A& ]&x, x[). (13)





N"S)(A& ]&x, x[) are nondecreasing in x. Furthermore, they
are bounded by 1, so that the limit in (13) exists and is smaller than or
equal to 1. Theorem A.2 implies that DS is a measure on the measurable
space (R, L).
We additionally define the values of DS on & and +, as follows.




















Hence, the agents in N"S (respectively, in S) are arbitrarily kept at 1
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space (R ,L  ), cf. Remark A.4. It suffices to show that





By uncompromisingness, DS(]&,1 [)= D
&
S (]&, 1[) and DS([1, +[)
=D
+

















N"S)([1, +[) and D
+





Hence, (15) holds and therefore, (14). This completes Step 1.
Step 2. Validity of (12). Let R # R
N and j # [0, ..., k]. First, we show
that 8(R) coincides with DSj on ]p
j(R), p
j+1(R)[. Let x # R be such that
x>p (R) and &x<p

(R). By uncompromisingness and successive replace-
















N"Sj) is constant on ]p
j(R), p
j+1(R)[ when x converges to +.
This limit is exactly the distribution DSj as defined in (13). Hence, 8(R)
and DSj coincide on ]p
j(R), p
j+1(R)[. Thus, the first part of (12) is valid.
It remains to determine the weights that 8(R) places on the peaks of R.
Let p
j(R) be one of the peaks. Consider the probabilistic rule 8  on
R
N"(Sj"Sj&1) defined by for all R  # R
N"(Sj"Sj&1), 8  (R  )#8(R  , RSj"Sj&1). Note
that for all i # Sj"Sj&1, p(Ri)=p
j(R). Because 8 satisfies strategy-proof-
ness and peaks-onliness, 8  satisfies strategy-proofness and peaks-onliness.
Now, similar to DSj&1, we can define D  Sj&1. Then, by the definition of these
fixed distributions and uncompromisingness,






















=D  Sj&1([&, p





the desired conclusion. Hence, (12) holds and the proof is complete. K
Moulin [18] characterizes all anonymous, strategy-proof, and peaks-only
deterministic rules. For each profile, such a rule chooses the median of
2n+1 ``numbers'': n reported peaks and n+1 additional fixed ballots
(``phantom'' peaks). Moulin's result follows easily from his characterization
of all strategy-proof and peaks-only deterministic rules. Similarly, a charac-
terization of strategy-proof and peaks-only probabilistic rules which are in
addition anonymous can be derived from Theorem 4.1, as follows.
Let 8 be an anonymous, strategy-proof, and peaks-only probabilistic rule.
Then, by Theorem 4.1, 8 is characterized by 2
n fixed probabilistic ballots.
Consider the calibration of these distributions in the proof of Theorem 4.1.
For S #2
N, the distribution DS is the limit of 8 when the peaks of S con-
verge to & and the peaks of N"S to +. Therefore, for all T #2
N such
that |S|=|T|, anonymity implies DS=DT. Thus, these limits depend only
on the cardinality of the set S, and |S|#[0, 1, ..., n]. This yields the follow-
ing corollary.
Corollary 4.1. Let 8 be a probabilistic rule. Then 8 satisfies
anonymity, strategy-proofness, and peaks-onliness if and only if there exists
a collection 2 of fixed probabilistic ballots such that for all S, T #2
N, if
|S|=|T|, then DS=DT, and 8=8
2. Moreover, if a probabilistic rule is
anonymous, strategy-proof, and peaks-only, then the collection 2 is uniquely
determined.
In a characterization the properties that are used should be independent.
Here, independence holds for Theorem 4.1 and Corollary 4.1. This follows
from the fact that the probabilistic setting is a generalization of the deter-
ministic one, as will be shown later. Finally, we show how to modify
Example 4.2 such that the probabilistic rule satisfies anonymity.
Example 4.3 (Example 4.2 continued). Since 8
2(R1, R2)=D[1]{D[2]
=8
2(R2, R1), the probabilistic rule 8
2 violates anonymity.L e t
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In this section we show that unanimity and strategy-proofness imply
Pareto-optimality and peaks-onliness. As a result, the only-if part of
Theorem 4.1 remains true if we replace peaks-onliness by unanimity.
Proposition 5.1. Unanimity and strategy-proofness imply Pareto-opti-
mality.
Proof.L e t8 be a probabilistic rule satisfying unanimity and
strategy-proofness.L e tR # R
N. To show Pareto-optimality, by Lemma 2.2,
we have to show that 8(R)([p

(R), p (R)])=1. We prove the assertion by
induction on the number of different peaks of R.
Induction basis: k=1. Suppose that all peaks at R coincide, i.e., for all
i, j # N, p(Ri)=p(Rj). Since for all i # N, B(p(Ri), Ri)=[p(Ri)], unanimity
and strategy-proofness imply 8(R)([p(R1)])=1, the desired conclusion.
Induction step: k>1. Assume that 8 is Pareto-optimal for all profiles
which have less than k>1 different peaks. Let R # R
N be such that R has




B(p (R), Ri1)$B(p (R), Ri2)$ }}}$B(p (R), Rim), (16)
where S1=[i1, i2, ..., im]. Note that ordering (16) is possible because the
reported preferences are strict on each side of the peak. Therefore, for all
j# S1 and some aj #[& , p

(R)], B(p (R), Rj)=[aj, p (R)] or B(p (R), Rj)
=]aj, p (R)]. Thus, ai1ai2}}}aim. Then
8(R)(B(p (R), Ri1))8(RN"[i1], R
p  (R)
i1 )(B(p  (R), Ri1))
8(RN"[i1], R
p (R)
i1 )(B(p  (R), Ri2))
8(RN"[i1, i2], R
p  (R)




S1 )(B(p (R), Rim)),
where the first, the third, ... inequalities follow from strategy-proofness, the
second, the fourth, ... from (16) and monotonicity of distributions (cf.
Remark A.2). Because (RN"S1, R
p  (R)
S1 )h a sk&1 different peaks, then, by our
induction assumption, 8(RN"S1, R
p (R)
S1 )i sPareto-optimal. Hence, by the
above inequalities and B(p (R), Rim)$[p

(R), p  (R)],
8(R)(B(p (R), Ri1))8(RN"S1, R
p  (R)
S1 )(B(p (R), Rim))=1.
424 EHLERS, PETERS, AND STORCKENSince 8(R) is a probability distribution, we have that 8(R)(]&, p (R)])
=1. Similarly, it follows that 8(R)([p

(R), +[)=1. Thus, by the two
previous facts, 8(R)([p

(R), p  (R)])=1, the desired conclusion. K
An immediate consequence is that for strategy-proof probabilistic rules,
unanimity and Pareto-optimality are equivalent. Next, we show that una-
nimity and strategy-proofness imply peaks-onliness. First, we need the
following lemma.
Lemma 5.1. Let 8 be a probabilistic rule satisfying unanimity and
strategy-proofness. Let i # N and R, R  # R be i-deviations such that either
p(Ri)=p(R  i)=p

(R) or p(Ri)=p(R  i)=P  (R). Then 8(R)=8(R  ).
Proof. By Proposition 5.1, 8 satisfies Pareto-optimality. Let [a, b[
[p

(R), p (R)]. By Pareto-optimality and because L is generated by all
right half open intervals, it is sufficient to prove that 8(R)([a, b[)=













where the equalities follow from Pareto-optimality and the inequality from














(R), b[). Hence, 8(R  )([a, b[)=8(R)([a, b[).
Case 2. p(Ri)=p (R). This case is analogous to Case 1. K
Now we are able to prove the main result of this section.
Proposition 5.2. Unanimity and strategy-proofness imply peaks-onli-
ness.
Proof. By Proposition 5.1, 8 satisfies Pareto-optimality.L e tj # N and
R, R$#R
N be j-deviations such that p(Rj)=p(R$ j). We have to show that











(R)=p (R), then Pareto-optimality implies 8(R)=8(R$). Thus, let
k2 and for some m # [1, ..., k&1], x #[p
m(R), p
m+1(R)].
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m(R), p
m+1(R)[. Let R  #R
N be such that
for all i # N:
v if p(Ri)<p
m(R), then p(R  i)#p
m(R) and B(x, R  i)#B(x, Ri),
v if p(Ri)#[p
m(R), p
m+1(R)],t h e nR  i#Ri,
v if p(Ri)>p
m+1(R), then p(R  i)#p
m+1(R) and B






(R), x])=8(R  )([p

(R), x]). (18)




8(RN"[i], R  i)(B(x, Ri))
=8(RN"[i], R  i)(B(x, R  i))




where the first and the last equalities follow from Pareto-optimality, the
second from the choice of R  i, and the inequalities from strategy-proofness.
Thus, by Pareto-optimality, for all i # S1,
8(R)([p

(R), x])=8(RN"[i], R  i)([p

(R), x]).
Therefore, by successively replacing for all i # S1 the relation Ri by R  i,
8(R)([p

(R), x])=8(RN"S1, R  S1)([p

(R), x]).
By repeating the above arguments for (RN"Sl, R  Sl) and (RN"Sl+1, R  Sl+1),
l# [1, ..., m&2], we obtain that
8(RN"Sl, R  Sl)([p






(R), x])=8(RN"Sm&1, R  Sm&1)([p

(R), x]). Using the same
arguments as above, we can show that 8(RN"Sm&1, R  Sm&1)(]x, p (R)])=
8(R  )(]x, p (R)]). Hence, Pareto-optimality yields (18).
With the analogous definition of R  $ for R$ we find that
8(R$)([p

(R), x])=8(R  $)([p

(R), x]). (19)
Note that the peak profiles of R  and R  $ coincide and these profiles only
have the two different peaks p
m(R) and p
m+1(R). Thus, by repeated
426 EHLERS, PETERS, AND STORCKENapplication of Lemma 5.1, 8(R  )=8(R  $). Hence, by (18) and (19), (17)
holds for all x #]p
m(R), p
m+1(R)[.
If x # [p
m(R), p
m+1(R)], then, similarly as in the proof of Lemma 2.1,
Theorem A.1 can be used to show (17). K
Propositions 5.1 and 5.2 enable us to characterize all unanimous,
anonymous,a n dstrategy-proof probabilistic rules. Let Q
+ and Q
&
denote the probability distributions placing probability 1 on + and
&, respectively. If 8 is a unanimous, anonymous, and strategy-proof
probabilistic rule, then 8 is Pareto-optimal and peaks-only. Thus, by
Corollary 4.1, 8 is characterized by n+1 fixed probability distributions.
Consider the determination of these distributions in the proof of
Theorem 4.1. Since 8 is unanimous, it follows that D< and DN are the one-
point distributions on + and &, respectively. Therefore, D<=Q
+
and DN=Q
&. The following corollary summarizes this.
Corollary 5.1. Let 8 be a probabilistic rule. Then 8 satisfies unanim-
ity, anonymity, and strategy-proofness if and only if there exists a collection




N, if |S|=|T|, then DS=DT, and 8=8
2. Moreover, if a
probabilistic rule is unanimous, anonymous, and strategy-proof, then the
collection 2 is uniquely determined.
Remark 5.1. Observe that in the situation of Corollary 5.1, the distribu-
tions D< and DN do not play an active role and can be dropped from the
description. Consequently, a unanimous, anonymous, and strategy-proof
probabilistic rule is determined by n&1 fixed probability distributions.
Note that by Corollary 5.1, Examples 4.2 and 4.3 violate unanimity.
The following is an example of a nontrivial probabilistic rule satisfying
unanimity, anonymity and strategy-proofness.
FIG. 1. The distribution chosen by the probabilistic rule 8
2 at R.
427 STRATEGY-PROOF PROBABILISTIC DECISION SCHEMESExample 5.1. Let N#[1, ..., 5]. We fix four probability distributions
D1, ..., D4 as follows. For all k # [1, ..., 4], Dk distributes
1
5&k uniformly
over [0, 1[ and Dk([1])#1&
1
5&k.L e tD0([1])#1 and D5([0])#1. Let
2#(D|S|)S #2 N.L e tR # R




2 chooses the following distribution.















2(R)([p(R5)])=0. In addition, 8
2(R) distributes uniformly probability
1
20 over the interval ]p(R1), p(R2)[,
1
15 over the interval ]p(R2), p(R3)[,
1
10
over the interval ]p(R3), p(R4)[, and
1
5 over the interval ]p(R4), p(R5)[.
See Fig. 1.
A subclass of fixed-probabilistic-ballots rules may be obtained as follows.
For n agents, fix n&1 probability distributions over R  and draw fixed
ballots (in the sense of Moulin [18]) according to these distributions.
Next, take the median of these ballots and the peaks of the reported
preferences. By using uncompromisingness, it is straightforward to check
that such a probabilistic rule is unanimous, anonymous, and strategy-proof,
and thus belongs to the class described in Corollary 5.1. Except for the case
n=2, however, the class of probabilistic rules described in Corollary 5.1
contains rules that cannot be obtained as randomization of Moulin's fixed
ballots (``phantom voter'') rules.
For N=[1, 2], let D< put probability 1 on +, let D1#D[1]=D[2],
let DN put probability 1 on &,a n d2#(D<, D[1], D[2], DN). The
corresponding rule 8
2 is the general form of a unanimous, anonymous, and
strategy-proof rule, see Corollary 5.1. If the agents report peaks a and b
with a<b, then the resulting probability distribution coincides with D1
between a and b, and puts D1([&, a]) on a,a n dD1([b,+ ]) on b.
Alternatively, taking the median of a, b, and a number * drawn according
to D1 results in exactly the same rule. Therefore, this rule can be inter-
preted as randomizing between the fixed ballot rules of Moulin.
For N=[1, 2, 3], Corollary 5.1 implies that any unanimous, anonymous,
and strategy-proof rule is a fixed-probabilistic-ballots rule with D< and DN
as above, and with probabilistic ballots D1 and D2 for one- and two-person
coalitions, respectively. Let D  1 and D  2 be the distribution functions corre-
sponding to D1 and D2, respectively. That is, for all x # R, D  1(x)#
D1([&, x]) and D  2(x)#D2([&, x]). Let a, b, c # R be such that
a<b<c and R #R
N be such that p(R)=(a, b, c). The fixed-probabilistic-










428 EHLERS, PETERS, AND STORCKENIn order to obtain the same result by drawing fixed ballots *1 and *2
according to distribution functions Q  1 and Q  2 we should have for all x # R
that
D  1(x)=Prob[max[*1, *2]x]
D  2(x)=Prob[min[*1, *2]x],
which implies that Q  1 and Q  2 should satisfy for all x # R:
D  1(x)=Q  1(x) Q  2(x), D  2(x)=Q  1(x)+Q  2(x)&Q  1(x) Q  2(x).
Therefore, for all x #R, Q  1(x) and Q  2(x) must be the roots of the poly-
nomial X
2&(D  1(x)+D  2(x))X+D  1(x). Hence, the discriminant of this
polynomial must be nonnegative, which implies (D  1(x)+D  2(x))
24D  1(x).
It is easy to see that this inequality does not need to hold, e.g., if
0<D  1(x)=D  2(x)<1.
6. DETERMINISTIC RULES
A deterministic rule . chooses for each profile R# R
N a level .(R)#R.
With each deterministic rule . we associate the corresponding probabilistic
rule 8
. such that for each R # R
N, 8
.(R) places probability 1 on the point
.(R). Conversely, with a one-point probabilistic rule 8, i.e., a probabilistic
rule that places for each profile probability 1 on a single point, we associate
the deterministic rule .
8 in the obvious way. The properties unanimity,
Pareto-optimality, anonymity, strategy-proofness, and peaks-onliness, when
applied to one-point probabilistic rules, are equivalent to the correspond-
ing properties for deterministic rules. Therefore, they do not need separate
introduction.
The literature derives several formulas for the description of the class of
deterministic rules satisfying strategy-proofness and peaks-onliness. There is
the minmax formula in Moulin [18], the maxmin formula in Border and
Jordan [7], or the formula for the augmented median solution in Ching
[8]. We will now consider the implications of the expressions (11) and (12)
for deterministic rules, and show that these indeed give the same result.
Suppose that 8 is a one-point probabilistic rule meaning that for each
R# R
N, 8(R) places probability one on a unique point in R. By Eq. (12)
and the fact that 8 is deterministic, for all S #2
N the probabilistic ballot DS
must be a one-point distribution over R  . For every S#2
N, let aS # R  denote
the point on which DS places probability 1. Since D<([&])=0 and
429 STRATEGY-PROOF PROBABILISTIC DECISION SCHEMESDN([+])=0, we obtain a<>& and aN<+. Condition (11)







=&1, which contradicts (11).) For all R #R





















Now consider the collection of points p
1(R), ..., p
k(R)a n daS0, ..., aSk such
that both p
l(R) and aSl are taken with multiplicity equal to the number of
agents in Sl"Sl&1. According to the minmax formula of Moulin [18] at
the profile R the median of these points should be chosen. The assignment
of .
8 in (21) does exactly that. If aSl is the median, then p
l(R)
aSl<p
l+1(R) and thus .
8(R)=aSl.I fp
l(R) is the median, then
aSlp
l(R)<aSl&1 and thus .
8(R)=p




l+1(R) and aSl is the median, and if .
8(R)=p
l(R)t h e n
aSlp
l(R)<aSl&1 and p
l(R) is the median.
Let us now consider the relationship between an implication of our
results for the deterministic case and those in the literature, notably Moulin
[18]. One result there characterizes all anonymous, strategy-proof,
Pareto-optimal,a n dpeaks-only deterministic rules. These assign the median
of the peaks of the reported profile and n&1 fixed ballots. Because all our
results apply to one-point probabilistic rules, they also apply to deter-
ministic rules. In particular, Corollary 5.1 and Remark 5.1 imply the
following result which is a strengthening of the main result in Moulin [18]
for preferences that are strict on either side of the peak. Also Ching [8]
proves this result in the deterministic setting.
Theorem 6.1. Let . be a deterministic rule. Then . is unanimous,
anonymous, and strategy-proof if and only if there exist n&1 fixed ballots
such that for each R # R
N, . chooses the median of the peaks at R and the
n&1 fixed ballots. Alternatively, . can be described by (21) such that
430 EHLERS, PETERS, AND STORCKENa<=+, aN=&, and for all S, T #2
N, if |S|=|T|, then aS=aT.
Moreover, these fixed ballots are uniquely determined.
Let . be a deterministic rule. Then . satisfies uncompromisingness if for
all i # N and all R, R  # R
N,i fR and R  are i-deviations and either
p(Ri)<.(R)a n dp(R  i).(R)o rp(Ri)>.(R) and p(R  i).(R  ), then
.(R  )=.(R).
Lemma 6.1. A deterministic rule satisfies uncompromisingness if and only
if the associated one-point probabilistic rule satisfies uncompromisingness.
Proof. The only-if part is left to the reader. For the if-part, let 8 be a one-
point probabilistic rule. We show that .
8 satisfies uncompromisingness. Let
i# N and R, R  # R
N be i-deviations. Let x # R be such that 8(R)([x])=1.
Suppose p(Ri)<x. Thus, .
8(R)=x.I fp(R  i)<x, then, by uncompromising-
ness, 8(R  ) places probability 1 on x. Thus, .
8(R  )=x.
Suppose that p(R  i)=x.B yuncompromisingness, 8(R  )([p(Ri), x])=
8(R)([p(Ri), x])=1. Since 8(R  ) is a one-point distribution, there exists
y#[p(Ri), x] such that 8(R  ) puts weight 1 on y. Therefore, .
8(R  )=y.I t
sufficestoshowy=x.Ify<x, thenletR$#Rbeani-deviationfromRsuchthat
p(R$ i)=y. Likeaboveitfollowsthat8(R$)istheone-pointprobabilitymeasure
on x, i.e., 8(R$)([y])=0. But then agent i can increase this probability by
deviating to R  i, contradicting strategy-proofness. Thus, y=x and .
8(R  )=x,
the desired conclusion. K
Lemma 6.1 and Corollary 3.1 imply that a deterministic rule satisfies
strategy-proofness and peaks-onliness if and only if it satisfies uncom-
promisingness. Ching [8] also shows this result.
The following example establishes the independence of unanimity from
all the other properties.




p(R1)i f p(R1)#[& 1 ,1],
1i f p(R1)>1.
It is straightforward to check that . satisfies anonymity, strategy-proofness,
peaks-onliness,a n duncompromisingness, but not unanimity.
The unanimity requirement can be seen, basically, as a condition on the
range of the rule. In the deterministic framework and in the presence of
strategy-proofness it can be replaced by surjectivity of the rule or by a
direct condition on the range. The latter is employed in Barbera  and
431 STRATEGY-PROOF PROBABILISTIC DECISION SCHEMESJackson [4, Theorem 3]. In the probabilistic setting, however, it is not
clear what an alternative appropriate range condition is.
In the deterministic setting, Ching [8] shows that in the presence of
strategy-proofness, peaks-onliness and continuity are equivalent. Continuity
means that for a given preference profile, for each agent small changes in
his preference relation only cause small changes of the point chosen by the
deterministic rule. In the probabilistic setting there are several definitions of
``small changes'' in probability distributions (for example relative to the
weak convergence topology). We leave this and the above point for further
research.
APPENDIX
In this appendix we collect some basic concepts and results from
measure theory that are used in the paper. These results can be found for
example in Halmos [17].
Definition A.1. Let X be a nonempty set and X be a set of subsets of
X. Then X is called a _-algebra in X if X satisfies the following:
(i) < # X.
(ii) If A # X, then X"A# X.
(iii) If I is a countable index set and for all i # I, Ai # X,t h e n
i # I Ai # X.
The pair (X, X) is called a measure space and the elements of X are called
measurable sets.
Remark A.1. Let X be a nonempty set and X be a set of subsets of X.
Then there exists a unique _-algebra E in X such that XE and for all
other _-algebras E$i nX,i fXE$, then EE$. The _-algebra E in X is
said to be generated by X. Notation: A(X)=E.
For example, the Borel _-algebra is the unique _-algebra in R generated
by the collection of all left half open intervals J#[]a, b]|a, b # R, ab].
Hence, A(J)=L and (R, L) is a measure space. The same holds for the
collection of all right half open intervals.
Definition A.2. Let (X, X) be a measure space and + a function from
X to [0, +]. Then + is called a measure on (X, X)i f( 1 )+(<)=0 and
(2) for all A1, A2, ... in X, which are pairwise disjoint, +(n # N An)=
n # N +(An)( _-additivity).
432 EHLERS, PETERS, AND STORCKENRemark A.2. It is straightforward to prove that each measure + on a
measure space (X, X)i smonotonic, i.e., for all A, B# X such that A$B,
+(A)+(B).
The following theorem is a well-known result from measure theory.
Theorem A.1. Let + be a finite valued measure on (X, X), i.e., for all
A# X, +(A)<+. Then for all sequences (Ai)i # N such that for all i # N,
Ai # X, and either i # N Ai=A and for all i # N, AiAi+1, or i # N Ai=A
and for all i # N, Ai$Ai+1, we have +(A)=limi+ +(Ai).
The following remark is a useful tool to prove equality of two measures,
which are defined on the same measure space.
Definition A.3. Let X be a nonempty set and X a set of subsets of X.
Then X is called a basis of X if (1) for all A1, A2 # X, A1 &A2 # X, and (2)
for each AX, there exists a set sequence (Ai)i # N with for all i # N, Ai # X
and AiAi+1, such that i # N Ai=A.
Remark A.3. Let X be a nonempty set, X a set of subsets of X, and
+1, +2 two measures on (X, A(X)). Suppose that (1) X is a basis of X,( 2 )
for all A # X, +1(A)=+2(A), and (3) +1(X)<+. Then +1=+2.
For example, if P1 and P2 are two probability measures on (R, L), then
in order to show P1=P2 it suffices to prove that for all intervals
]a, b]#J, P1(]a, b])=P2(]a, b]). It also suffices to prove that for all
intervals [a, b[, P1([a, b[)=P2([a, b[).
Remark A.4. Consider the measure space (R, L). Then the Borel
_-algebra in R  is defined by
L  #[A, A_[&], A_[+], A_[&,+ ] | A # L].
Let + be a measure on (R, L). Define some arbitrary nonnegative
weights of + for & and +. Then + can be easily extended to a measure
on (R ,L  ).
Finally, we define setwise convergence in order to formulate the theorem
of VitaliHahnSaks.
Definition A.4. Let (X, X) be a measure space, I an infinite index set
in R, and for all i # I, +i a measure on (X, X). If limi+ +i(A) exists for
every measurable set A # X, then we say that (+i)i # I converges setwise.
Theorem A.2( V italiHahnSaks). Let (X, X) be a measure space and
(+i)i # I a setwise convergent infinite sequence of measures on (X, X). For all
433 STRATEGY-PROOF PROBABILISTIC DECISION SCHEMESA# X, let +(A)#limi+ +i(A). If + is finite valued, then + is a measure
on (X, X).
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